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ABSTRACT
The quality of contracting institutions has been thought to be of second-order
importance next to the impact that good property rights institutions can have
on long-run growth. Using a large range of proxies for each type of institution,
we find a robust negative link between the quality of contracting institutions and
long-run growth when we condition on property rights and a number of additional
macroeconomic variables. Although the result remains something of a puzzle, we present
evidence which suggests that only when property rights institutions are good do
contracting institutions appear also to be good for development. Good
contracting institutions can reduce long-run growth when property rights are not
secured, presumably because the gains from the (costly) contracting institutions
cannot be realised. This suggests that contracting institutions can benefit growth,
and that the sequence of institutional change can matter.
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The impact of institutional quality on economic development has been the
focus of a great deal of recent empirical work. Knack and Keefer (1995),
Hall and Jones (1999), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004)
have all looked to establish the robustness of the connection between in-
stitutional quality and economic development; Beck (2010) is a recent and
thorough survey of the literature. Following North (1981), Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) considered two types of institutions: Those that aect trans-
action costs and the costs of forming contracts (`contracting institutions')
and those that determine the security of private property (`property rights
institutions'). Using historical data to instrument for and distinguish be-
tween each type of institution, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005, henceforth AJ)
concluded that the quality of property rights institutions can be robustly
related to various economic outcomes, particularly income per capita, while
contracting institutions in general cannot.
This paper explores the impact of contracting institutions in more depth.
Initially using the same cross-country proxies as AJ, we show that higher
quality contracting institutions decrease income per capita. This nding is
consistent across the proxies and instruments used in AJ and is robust to the
introduction of a number of controls. It also holds when we expand the range
of proxies for contracting institutions to include some more recent data from
Djankov et al. (2008). We also address the inuential critique of Glaeser et al.
(2004) which questioned the validity of the instruments AJ use to identify
the impact of property rights institutions. In particular, they demonstrate
2that those instruments are more correlated with human capital today than
they are with property rights institutions today. We replicate those ndings
but show in addition that their critique cannot be applied to the proxies used
to measure the quality of contracting institutions.
The cross-country data show, then, that there is a robust negative link
between a number of proxies for the quality of contracting institutions and
long-run growth. Clearly, this result is something of a puzzle but there are a
number of potential ways to understand it. Wallis and North (1986) found
that the proportion of US GNP allocated to what they termed the `transac-
tion sector' grew over the one hundred year period they study. If the proxies
used to measure the quality of contracting institutions are in fact picking up
such a shift in the allocation of resources then this paper is further evidence
that the transaction sector does grow as an economy develops. Alternatively,
if the proxies really do measure the quality of institutions, it might be that
the costs of sustaining good contracting institutions are signicant, and that
those costs can sometimes dominate the gains that low transaction costs de-
liver to the rest of the economy. We present some evidence to support the
latter interpretation: Net gains from good contracting institutions are found
when property rights institutions are also good, but not when property rights
are of poor quality.
In Section 2 we describe the data and empirical strategy, giving our main
results based principally on the data used in AJ. In the cross-section, the
eect of better contracting institutions is to reduce income per capita. In
Section 3 we check the robustness of these results against some newer data for
contracting institutions, and present results from regressions conditioning on
3other potential determinants of income. In Section 4 we look to understand
some parts of these results while Section 5 oers some concluding remarks.
2 Estimating the Eect of Contracting Insti-
tutions
This paper follows AJ in distinguishing between property rights and contract-
ing institutions. There are a number of reasons to think that each type of
institution could determine economic outcomes. The transaction cost litera-
ture after Coase (1960) and Williamson (2000) argues that poor contracting
institutions limit the ability of private agents to settle disputes, to diversify
against risks, to form large markets and to choose optimal organizational
structures. Contracting institutions, in this view, are directly related with
income levels and growth rates. Alongside contracting institutions, the im-
portance for development of securing property rights has been raised by De
Soto (2001), while the potential economic consequences of the power of mi-
nority elites has been put forcefully by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). The
quality of property rights institutions should also, then, be expected to aect
economic outcomes.
We rst use the six proxies of institutional quality used in AJ and then
consider alternatives in Section 3. The three proxies for the quality of con-
tracting institutions are measures of the number of procedures and of proce-
dural complexity from World Bank (2004), and an index of legal formalism
from Djankov et al. (2003). For property rights, we employ the measure of
4protection against expropriation averaged over 1985-1995 used in Knack and
Keefer (1995), a 1990s average of the constraint on executive power from
Polity IV (2006), and a measure of the degree of protection of private prop-
erty from Gwartney and Lawson (1997).
OLS regressions using the institutional proxies reveal signicant univari-
ate correlations between institutional proxies and income per capita, invest-
ment to GDP ratio and stock market capitalization and the ratio of private
credit to GDP (AJ, Table 2). Better contracting and a greater degree of secu-
rity of rights over property can be associated, at least on a simple level, with
better economic outcomes. We could proceed to use a multivariate OLS
approach and estimate the eect of contracting institutions when control-
ling for property rights. An immediate problem in interpreting such results
is that both sets of institutional proxies are likely endogenous, so reverse
causality or the eect of omitted variables could be showing up in the OLS
coecients. Moreover, likely measurement error in the proxies introduces
downward bias to the estimated coecients and, where they are correlated,
that variable measured with greatest error will appear more signicant. AJ
addresses both issues by establishing that historical data from colonial settle-
ments can be used with legal origins data to instrument separately for each
type of institution.
The instrument for contracting institutions is a dummy variable for whether
the country has a civil or common law tradition. The legal origins literature,
such as La Porta et al. (1998), argues that an historical tradition of com-
mon law is correlated with institutions that better enforce private contracts.
Djankov et al. (2003) show the strong connection between legal origin and
5their measure for legal formalism. The instruments for property rights in-
stitutions are the mortality rates of colonial settlers and population density
in each country in year 1500. Acemoglu et al. (2001) showed that higher
mortality rates meant that settlers were more likely to install extractive in-
stitutions with greater centralisation of power in a governing elite. Acemoglu
et al. (2002) found that colonial settlers who found dense local populations
were more likely to establish authoritarian systems of governance.
The rst stage regressions for testing the validity of these instruments
in separating out each type of institution are given in AJ Table 3. The
legal origins instrument is signicantly correlated with proxies for contracting
institutions, but not with those for property rights. The settlement data is
signicantly correlated with proxies for property rights institutions, and not
with those for contracting institutions.1 The use of both instruments in the
2SLS procedure thus enables AJ to isolate the separate eects of each type
of institution of economic outcomes.
2.1 The Glaeser et al. (2004) Critique
In an inuential study, Glaeser et al. (2004) questioned the validity of the
colonial origins instruments employed in AJ. A key argument is that the in-
struments used to identify the robust eects of property rights institutions
are correlated with the error term of the regression equation; in particu-
lar, that they are strongly correlated with current levels of human capital (as
measured by average school years from Barro and Lee, 1996). In other words,
1Specically, AJ regress each of the six institutional proxies on legal origin with log
settler mortality and legal origin with log population density. The explanatory power of
the instruments is generally strong (median R2 = 0:37).
6it is not plausible that the only thing colonial settlers left behind was the
quality of institutions. While the Glaeser et al. analysis is principally con-
cerned with the property rights institutions, Table 1 reports correlations with
schooling for both forms of institutions, where P1-3 (C1-3) are the proxies
for the quality of property rights (contracting) institutions.
Table 1: Instruments and Human Capital, pairwise correlations
P1 P2 P3 C1 C2 C3 schooling
schooling 0.66 0.55 0.64 -0.35 -0.15 -0.20 -
log population density -0.40 -0.41 -0.51 0.20 0.08 0.03 -0.63
log settler mortality -0.47 -0.48 -0.41 0.33 0.21 0.30 -0.68
legal origin 0.31 0.13 0.41 -0.76 -0.68 -0.48 0.27
N.B. Results are for the sample of former colonies. Legal origin is a dummy variable equal to
one for each English legal tradition. Schooling is average years of schooling over the period
1960{2000. P1 is average expropriation; P2 is constraint on the executive; P3 is security
of property rights. C1 is legal formalism; C2 is procedural complexity; C3 is number of
procedures. See Table 7 for detailed variable descriptions.
The correlation between human capital and the instruments for prop-
erty rights is stronger than the correlation between the instruments and the
property rights proxies themselves. This is the Glaeser et al. problem: A
2SLS approach that excludes human capital has the potential to make prop-
erty rights institutions appear more signicant than they truly are. Un-
fortunately, as Bhattacharyya (2009) has shown, severe multicollinearity in
the second stage regressions means that an attempt to condition on and
instrument for human capital in estimating the eect of property rights in-
stitutions leaves no individual signicance among institutional and human
capital variables. Bhattacharyya shows that by exploiting the time-variation
in the quality of some forms of institutions identication can proceed using
7the dynamic panel estimation  a la Blundell and Bond (1998). Human capi-
tal and property rights institutions can then be shown to have separate and
signicant roles in explaining variations in growth.
Unfortunately, available proxies for contracting institutions are not suf-
cient for such a panel approach. However, Table 1 demonstrates that the
cross-country proxies for contracting institutions and legal origin do not suf-
fer from the problem that Glaeser, et al. identify. Schooling and legal origin
are less strongly related than any correlation between legal origin and the
contracting proxies. Since AJ showed that this set of instruments succeeds
in distinguishing between the two forms of institutional environments, it is
not so surprising that the Glaeser et al. critique can only be applied to one
of those types. Since the focus of this paper is on the role of contracting
institutions, we bear in mind a more careful interpretation of the coecients
on property rights institutions but proceed along the same lines as AJ. More-
over, we omit human capital as a control variables in tests of robustness in
Section 3.
2.2 Empirical Results
Table 2 reports the 2SLS results from all permutations of the three proxies for
each type of institution, one instrument for contracting and two instruments
for property rights institutions. The dependent variable is the log of the level
of per capita GDP in 1995. Because of the nature of the instruments, results
are restricted to the sample of former colonies.2
2One limitation of using historical instruments based on colonial settlements is that
our IV estimates must be based on the sub-sample comprised of former colonies. AJ Table
2 report univariate regressions of log GDP per capita in 1995 on each of the proxies for
8Panel A refers to results using the log of population density in 1500 as an
instrument for property rights institutions; Panel B gives results using the
log of settler mortality. In all regressions, the instrument for contracting in-
stitutions is a dummy variable for whether the country has a civil or common
law history. In each cell the left (right) hand numbers are the coecients on
the respective contracting (property rights) institution. Regressions reported
in AJ are here in bold.3
As can be seen in Table 2, the results for the relationship between property
rights institutions and log GDP per capita are signicant and of the expected
sign for all permutations of proxies and instruments. This is the nding of
AJ: More secure property rights, and greater constraints on executive power,
have a rst order and positive impact on income per capita. AJ did not
stress, however, the two regressions which reported a positive and signicant
coecient on the degree of formalism.
When we expand the number of regressions to all permutations, we see
that contracting institutions can more generally be related robustly with
worsening incomes per capita. In all regressions except those where the
degree of executive constraint is used as a proxy for property rights, the
contracting institution is a signicant determinant of log GDP per capita.
The sign of this relationship is, however, unexpected. The coecient on
contracting institutions is always positive (except for a {0.01). Countries with
more complex or more lengthy contractual processes appear to have higher
per capita incomes. This eect also appears to be large, quantitatively:
institutions; the coecients on each proxy do not vary signicantly across samples.
3Estimates are slightly dierent here because we use data from a more recent revision
of the Penn World Table, see Heston et al. (2009).
9Table 2: Institutions and Log GDP Per Capita in 1995 (2SLS results)
Panel A: Log Population Density
exec. constraint expropr. protection private prop.
degree of formalism
-0.01 0.83** 0.41** 1.04** 0.42** 1.36**
(0.20) (0.26) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.23)
procedural complexity
0.11 0.71** 0.37** 1.02** 0.38** 1.24**
(0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.22)
number of procedures
0.02 0.69** 0.07** 0.95** 0.05** 1.20**
(0.02) (0.18) (0.03) (0.18) (0.02) (0.25)
Panel B: Log Settler Mortality
exec. constraint expropr. protection private prop.
degree of formalism
0.05 0.98** 0.34** 0.98** 0.82** 2.43**
(0.22) (0.27) (0.15) (0.14) (0.35) (0.59)
procedural complexity
0.09 0.79** 0.33** 0.97** 0.73** 1.97**
(0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.13) (0.29) (0.45)
number of procedures
0.02 0.83** 0.08** 1.20** 0.13** 2.23**
(0.03) (0.19) (0.05) (0.29) (0.05) (0.52)
N.B. The left (right) hand numbers in each cell are the coecients on the respective
contracting (property rights) institution. Results in bold are those reported in AJ. ** and *
denote signicance at 5 and 10% respectively. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard
errors. Results are for the sample of former colonies. The instrument for contracting
institution is always a dummy variable equal to one for each English colony. The number
of observations varies between 51 and 69 according to data availability for each proxy and
each instrument.
On average, a one standard deviation increase in the quality of contracting
institutions leads to a 0.75 standard deviation decrease in the log of GDP
per capita (though this is smaller than the 1.36 standard deviation impact
that property rights institutions are estimated to have).4 Before considering
how to interpret this result, we rst present a number of robustness tests.
4The quantitative impact is calculated by taking the average of the signicant coe-
cients for each proxy and then averaging across proxies for each type of institution.
103 Robustness Checks
We present results when we condition on a large number of additional vari-
ables and also consider some more recently published proxies for contracting
institutions from Djankov et al. (2008).
3.1 Results with Control Variables
Table 3 gives second-stage results of 2SLS estimates of the eect of insti-
tutions when we control for a number of other potential determinants of
long-run growth. In particular, we control for the investment share of real
GDP and real openness from Heston et al. (2009), each averages over 1985{
2004 in constant 2005 prices. We also control for the 1985{2004 average ratio
of private credit to GDP from Beck et al. (2000) and, in addition, include ab-
solute latitude from La Porta et al. (1999). To save space, we omit coecient
estimates for the control variables.5
As can be seen by the results in Table 3, our previous conclusions about
the interactions between GDP per capita and institutions are robust to condi-
tioning on these additional variables. Coecients on proxies for contracting
institutions are very similar to those found in the baseline results. The co-
ecients on contracting institutions when executive constraint is used are
now positive and sometimes signicant. Overall, the quantitative impact is
slightly smaller: The eect of a one standard deviation change in contracting
institutions is to decrease GDP per capita by 0.50 standard deviations. The
coecients on proxies for property rights institutions are now smaller and
5In general, the share of investment and the private credit to GDP ratio both enter
signicantly.
11Table 3: Second stage results for institutions, with control variables
exec. constraint expropr. protection private prop.
degree of formalism
0.20 0.52* 0.41** 0.78** 0.38** 0.74**
(0.16) (0.27) (0.18) (0.34) (0.13) (0.28)
procedural complexity
0.21* 0.44** 0.39** 1.04** 0.38** 0.71*
(0.11) (0.21) (0.19) (0.51) (0.12) (0.38)
number of procedures
0.04** 0.30 0.05** 0.50* 0.05** 0.45
(0.01) (0.20) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.38)
N.B. The left (right) hand numbers in each cell are the coecients on the respective
contracting (property rights) institution. ** and * denote signicance at 5 and 10%
respectively. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Results are for the
sample of former colonies. Control variables are investment share of GDP, real openness,
absolute latitude and private credit to GDP. The instrument for contracting institution is
always a dummy variable equal to one for each English colony; that for property rights is
always log population density in 1500. The number of observations varies between 55 and
65 according to data availability for each proxy and each instrument.
sometimes insignicant (the overall quantitative impact is now 0.76 standard
deviations). It appears that the eect of the conditioning variables is to con-
rm the eect of contracting institutions and weaken slightly the role that
property rights institutions play. Again, we see that better property rights
institutions lead to higher GDP per capita while higher quality contracting
institutions reduce the level of GDP per capita.
3.2 Djankov et al. (2008) Debt Enforcement Data
Djankov et al. (2008) present survey responses from 88 countries regarding
a hypothetical case study of an hotel company called `Mirage'. Lawmakers
are questioned about the likely legal outcome for the company when it is
unable to pay its single creditor. Responses include data on the likely time
it takes between default and nal decision and the time between default and
12payments to the creditor. Using private sector lending rates, reported likely
time and expected costs, Djankov et al. (2003) also calculate a measure of
eciency, the present value of the eventual worth of the rm after costs. Each
of these variables can be considered as proxies for the quality of contracting
institutions. Table 4 gives rst stage results when we consider each of these
variables against potential instruments in the sample of former colonies.
Table 4: First Stage Regressions for Djankov et al. (2008) Contracting In-
stitutions
eciency time time to pay
legal origin
0.34** 0.30** -2.24** -2.23** -2.09** -2.08







R2 0.50 0.56 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.39
Obs. 35 32 35 32 35 32
N.B. ** and * denote signicance at 5 and 10% respectively. Numbers in parentheses
are robust standard errors. All regressions are based on the 35 former colonies with
Djankov et al. (2008) data. Legal origin is a dummy equal to one when the country
has an English legal history. The eciency variable is that in Djankov et al. (2008)
divided by 100.
The sample sizes are smaller than before, but it is clear that legal origin
still works as a strong instrument across all of the proxies, with signicant
coecients of the expected sign6 and good explanatory power. Moreover,
log population density is not signicantly correlated with any of the proxies.
We can thus use the approach employed in Section 2 to separate out the
eects of the dierent types of institutions. Table 5 reports the second stage
6Note that the eciency variable is a measure of contractual quality, while time and
time to pay are measures of contractual impediments, so we expect dierent signs.
13of 2SLS results using the three new proxies for contracting institutions with
the property rights enforcement measure.
Table 5: Second stage results with Djankov et al. (2008), with controls
log population density log settler mortality
private prop. private prop. private prop. private prop.
with controls with controls
eciency
-2.24** 1.35** -2.28** 1.18** -4.18** 1.98** -4.06** 1.98**
(0.26) (1.04) (1.07) (0.32) (1.83) (0.45) (1.90) (0.50)
time
0.33** 1.29** 0.25* 1.45** 0.37** 1.30** 0.31** 1.60**
(0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.39) (0.15) (0.21) (0.13) (0.47)
time to pay
0.38** 1.33** 0.29* 1.49** 0.39** 1.29** 0.33** 1.53**
(0.18) (0.25) (0.17) (0.42) (0.16) (0.21) (0.13) (0.47)
N.B. The left (right) hand numbers in each cell are the coecients on the respective
contracting (property rights) institution. ** and * denote signicance at 5 and 10%
respectively. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Results are for the
sample of former colonies. Control variables are investment share of GDP, real openness,
absolute latitude and private credit to GDP. The instrument for contracting institution is
always a dummy variable equal to one for each English colony. The number of observations
varies between 30 and 32. The eciency variable is that in Djankov et al. (2008) divided
by 100.
The eect of property rights institutions on the level of GDP per capita
is as found previously (after all, this is a sub-sample of data that we already
know to exhibit that relationship). In addition, and despite the small sample
size, Table 5 shows that results for the quality of contracting institution using
the new proxies are in line with those when using the set of proxies from AJ:
An economy characterized by better contracting institutions appears to have
lower long-run growth.
144 Discussion
The relationship between contracting institutions and the level of GDP per
capita does appear as a puzzle. The simplest explanation would be to in-
terpret the contracting proxies as measures of a greater sophistication in
the contracting environment { contracts might be more complex where more
complex, higher value-added goods are traded; the number of procedures
may be greater when there is greater specialization of the legal sector among
those procedures; and so on. This would support Wallis and North (1986),
which found that what they dene as the `transaction sector' roughly doubled
as a proportion of US GDP from 1870 to 1970.7 North (1993) has recently
argued that greater wealth changes the nature of exchange, increasing the
complexity of the rm and making investments in contracting institutions
a more important part of economic activity. AJ present evidence against
this interpretation of our results, however. In their xVI it is shown that the
proxies for contracting institutions used in this paper are aligned with rm-
level responses from managers asked specically about impediments to doing
business.
The data suggest, then, that better contracting institutions can reduce
the level of per capita income. We might start to understand this in the con-
text of a model where the costs of contracting are endogenous to investments
made into the institutions that facilitate transactions. This echoes Coase
(1992, p.716), who argues that \a large part of what we think of as eco-
nomic activity is designed to accomplish what high transaction costs would
7See also the survey in Klaes (2008).
15otherwise prevent." A similar argument has been formalized in a general
equilibrium framework of endogenous transaction costs and diversication
against risk (see Nolan and Trew, Forthcoming). Total transaction costs are
part ex ante investments in technologies that reduce the costs of exchange
and part ex post cost of making individual exchanges happen.
One interpretation is that when all countries in our sample are taken to-
gether, the gains from investments in contracting institutions are outweighed
by their costs. This is more plausible in contracting institutions than in
property rights institutions: An elite that decides not to expropriate pri-
vate property can do so at little or no cost; in contrast, maintaining a high
quality legal system to enforce individual contractual arrangements can rep-
resent a prolonged drain on state revenues. If sucient gains from lowering
transaction costs are not realised, investments in contracting institutions can
have deleterious economic consequences. Whether the costs of contracting
institutions are outweighed by the economic gains they engender might be
dependent on a number of other factors. As a rst step, Table 6 presents
results from OLS regressions of log GDP per capita on each measure of the
quality of contracting institutions, stratied by the quality of property rights
institutions and by income per capita.
Table 6 shows results from splitting the sample of countries into those
with high or low quality property rights institutions. The results suggest
that better contracting institutions benet long-run growth only when prop-
erty rights are also good. This holds for all proxies used in this paper. In
the sample of countries with low quality property rights, the coecients on
contracting institutions are, when signicant, of the opposite sign. A sim-
16Table 6: OLS correlations with 1995 log GDP per capita, by quantile
exec. constraint expropr. protection log GDP p.c.
I II I II I II
degree of formalism
0.03 -0.32** 0.27** -0.23** 0.21** -0.22**
(0.22) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
procedural complexity
0.02 -0.19** 0.24** -0.15* 0.10** -0.14**
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)
number of procedures
0.003 -0.04** 0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008)
eciency
1.39 1.89** 0.21 1.44** -1.27** 1.42**
(1.25) (0.19) (1.51) (0.29) (0.41) (0.20)
time
0.03 -0.23** 0.01 -0.18** 0.08 -1.55**
(0.19) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
time to pay
0.11 -0.19** 0.02 -0.13** 0.08 -0.11*
(0.21) (0.07) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
N.B. Results are for the entire sample of countries. Each column I reports estimates from
the sample of countries less than or equal to the median value of the variable noted at the
top of the column, with each column II being the sample of countries with a (non-missing)
value greater than the median. ** and * denote signicance at 5 and 10% respectively.
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
ilar pattern is seen when we split the sample into rich and poor countries;
contracting institutions appear to have a positive eect when the country is
already wealthy (this is perhaps not so surprising, given the strong, positive
impact that property rights have been found to have on development).
The results in Table 6 can only be suggestive of an explanation for the
results in Sections 2 and 3 and the data are not sucient to conduct IV es-
timation on subsamples of former colonies.8 Nonetheless, this interpretation
of the evidence is a natural one. When investments are likely to be expro-
priated, or when constraints on the executive are weak, the ease with which
8This appears to be a sample size problem; neither type of institutions are consistently
signicant when we split the samples and instrument in the manner of Section 2.
17contracts can be written or enforced with counterparties is less relevant for
economic development. When executive constraints are secure, investments
in contracting institutions can translate into economic growth.
5 Concluding Remarks
As dicult to interpret as these results are, they are based on an established
cross-country dataset of proxies for institutional quality and the identica-
tion strategy has been used in many other contexts to support the idea that
institutions are of fundamental importance. The interpretation in terms of
contracting institutions is largely suggestive, and no doubt other interpreta-
tions exist; as Rodrik et al. (2004, p.153) states, `an instrument does not
a theory make'. Nonetheless, the results do raise questions that point in a
number of potentially fruitful research directions. First, the costs of institu-
tions are little stressed and would seem here to be essential to understanding
the interaction between the quality of contracting institutions and economic
development. Second, the factors which determine whether the gains from
good institutions are realised are likely to be complex. Further research is
required to develop a more thorough understanding of both the positive and
negative consequences of good contracting institutions.
Part of the problem in both the theory and measurement of the relation-
ship between contracting institutions and economic outcomes is in dening
what transaction costs are; that is, where should we look to nd the gains
from better contracting institutions? We have suggested that transaction
costs can be thought of as part ex ante investments in technologies that re-
18duce the costs of exchange and part ex post costs of exchange themselves.
The macroeconomic conception of a transaction sector, as in Wallis and North
(1986), may be too broad while the measurement of the legal costs involved
in bilateral relationships, as in Djankov et al. (2008), may be too narrow. For
theoretical analyses, we need to understand, more generally, whether treating
the costs of exchange as endogenous to private decisions about investments
in institutions really does make a dierence to the qualitative implications
of models that typically invoke exogenous transaction costs. Clearly, these
ndings suggest that we place greater stress on the costs associated with
contracting institutions. What is missing is evidence of the net gains that
supporting high quality contracting institutions might bring. Given the lim-
itations of the cross-country data, we leave a search for those net gains to
future research.
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